The promise of the often publicized and much-vaunted Information Superhighway lies in the convergence of different electronic technologies onto a single platform. In past decades the transmission of television signals, processing of computer data, and carriage of voice telephony were all accomplished with vastly different technologies. The barriers began to fall in the 1980s with, among other tllings, the deployment of fiber optic cable. Fiber optics enabled the transmission of digital voice, data, and video on an identical medium.
Today there are many prevalent examples of convergence. Every major telephone company offers a variety of basic and advanced services; several companies have begun trial "video on demand" systems, where consumers use interactive networks to request individual television programs, rather than the traditional method of one-way cable TV. As a result, consumers, businesses, and institutions have become sophisticated users of electronic technology. One can now purchase a home computer that is a combined telephone, television, voice mailbox, electronic mailbox, and fax machine. Similarly, businesses and institutions use information technology for applications such as distance learning, telemedicine, video conferencing, and wide-area data communication.
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As technology advances, the cost of facilities and transmission spirals downward. Within a few months or years, the most advanced technology is replaced by something even more sophisticated. Markets for cutting-edge products and services initially are based on economic considerations and comparisons of new technology against existing methods. Therefore, the interaction of technology and economics drives development of the telecommunications indus tty to a large extent. However, a fundamental component of telecommunication economics is the use of cable right-ofway and the radio spectrum. Consequently, regulatory policy plays an important role in the industty, creating a triangle of technology, economics, and policy. Although today's technology is on the cutting edge of the Information Superhighway, policy appears to be lagging behind. The Communications Act of 1934 established the basic policy framework over sixty years ago; this was augmented by the 1982 Consent Decree that divested the Bell System.
l By most definitions, the speed of technological advancement is outpacing policy development. The Communications Act established dichotomies between various technologies, by regulating different technologies under separate titles. One of the most significant dichotomies is between telephone (Title II) and cable TV (Title VI) regulation. The Consent Decree also placed stringent restrictions on "Baby Bell" line-of-business activities, essentially limiting the companies to tlle provision of local exchange telephone service.
The stlUclllre of today's market is the result of one hundred years of interaction between technology, economics, and policy. For most of that time, telecommunication policy favored a Bell System monopoly on telephone service, while requiring other technologies to develop separdtely. As a result, dichotomous markets for telephone, television, and data processing emerged. Even in 1982, divestiture of the Bell System brought full competition for long distance telephone, but did not break down other market dichotomies. In the years since divestiture, and to a larger extent the years since passage of the Communications Act, many parties feel that policy has not acknowledged technological convergence sufficiently.
In the early 19905, several parties began calling for comprehensive reform of the Communications Act and Consent Decree. Industry players joined the White House.and Congressional leaders in proposals to break down decades-old barriers between converging digital technologies. The reformed market would be open to full competition between multiple providers of local and long distance telephone, cable TV, and computer data communications. Proponents of reform believe that full competition will bring the yet-undefined Information Superhighway into existence.
Just as assembly lines, factory automation, and mechanical devices characterized the Industrial Revolution, so will megabytes, cyberspace, and bits-persecond reflect the Information Revolution.
This paper will trace the development of telecommunication policy from its early origins to contemporary proposals for reform. Additionally, tl1e paper will discuss the over seventy-year history of developments leading to the breakup of AT&T, and tl1e evolution of policies tl1at separated the market into various segments. The latter part of the paper analyzes the potential impact of contemporary proposals on existing market conditions.
Telecommunication Policy
The principal components of telecommunication regulation are the For sixty-nine years, with three antitrust settlement" (1913, 1956, and 1982) After tlle customer entered a billing code and the terminating phone number, MCI would transmit the long distance pottion of the call to the destination city. At the destination city, MCI used its interconnection rights to terminate the call on the local exchange. lI Therefore, through Execunet, Mcr established a fully competitive long distance network. The only factors distinguishing MCI from AT&T were the number and type of locations selved, and the amount of digits the caller had to dial to access the network. The various market-oriented bills of 1978-1980 were consistent with tlle general deregulatOlY approach of the Carter administration and Congress at that time ... However, tlle complexities of tlle telecommunications problem prevented passage of telecommunication legislation .. .It was not possible to pass a sweeping deregulation bill similar to the one for tlle airline industry because local selvice was widely acknowledged to be an area of continuing monopoly power ... any market-oriented bill had to find a way to divide competitive and monopoly areas and prevent cross-subsidy of competitive services by monopoly selvices ... Each proposed bill generated a coalition of opponents strong enough to block its passage despite strenuous efforts to find a satisfactory legislative solution ... 12 In the backdrop of this legislative effOlt was the federal government's tllird antitrust suit against AT&T. The Ford administration filed a complaint in November 1974, after MCI sued AT&T over the private-line interconnection con-troversy. In the government's complaint, the Department of Justice claimed that AT&T was abusing its monopoly power, by internally subsidizing local telephone service, long distance telephone service, and equipment manufacturing, rendering head-to-head competition in anyone market infeasibJe.
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Ironically, the Bell System established such an internal subsidy structure because of its federally-sanctioned rehyulated monopoly in each line of business. 14 However, by the mid-19708 neither AT&T nor the FCC could stop MCI from a practice known as "cream-skimming," whereby MCI eroded the Bell System subsidy stmcture by competing only in the most profitable long-distance markets. Ii By allOWing MCI into the market, producing competition on the fringes of AT&T's monopoly, the FCC slowly drained the lifeblood out of the system that had protected the Bell monopoly for decades. 19 In a matter of months, the Information Superhighway became the folklore of newspaper business sections and The Wall Street Journal. Part of the reason the Information Superhighway grew popular so quickly was that it gave the public a convenient point of reference, or label, to understand technological convergence. Computers had come to proliferate in workplaces and educational institutions; consumers encountered information technology when conducting routine business transactions; parents saw their children developing more advanced computer skills than their own; and, most important, it became clear to d1e public that convergence technology soon would affect how people receive television programming and electronic entertainment.
In 1993 Bell Atlantic sought entry into the market for television by petitioning the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for approval of a plan to carry programming on a "video dial tone" platform. Video dial tone (VDT) is similar in many respects to cable TV, except that to receive programming the viewer "dials out" of a special set-top box rather than having all of the signals tr'ansmitted to the receiver Simultaneously. VDT uses powerful interac-tive digital switches not present in standard cable networks. In August 1993 the District Court granted Bell Atlantic's request, a ruling subsequently upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
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When combined with the TCI merger, Bell Atlantic's court victOlY threatened to tear down the regulatolY dichotomy between telephone and cable TV. Under the merger, TCI, a cable company, would cease to exist. Thus, TCI would avoid the Title VI restriction on cable and telephone company cross-ownership. At tlle same time, Bell Atlantic, the surviving company, had permission to provide both television and telephone service. 21 Therefore, tlle combined Bell Atlantic-TCI could legally provide hybrid telephone and television service in their previously overlapping selvice areas.
Part of the reason the Information
Superhighway grew popular so quickly was that it gave the public a convenient point of reference, or labe~ to understand technological convergence. 
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Telecommunication reform did not pass tlle 103rd Congress for the same reasons it failed in me 96t1l Congress: the bills created an incorrigible mix of winners and losers. Legislative efforts in the 103rd Congress addressed five telecorlli11unication policy issues: allowance of telephone companies into cable TV, competition in local exchange telephone service, RBOC entry into long distance, public utilities entry into telecommunications, and entlY of RBOCs into manufacturing. However, each provision simultaneously created a winner without necessarily giving the loser an offsett.ing benefit. Each of the issues is described below, as it was addressed in the 103rd Congress legislation. Altll0ugh Congress failed to enact any reforms, tl1e five issues will shape debate over telecommunication reform for years to come. Furthermore, in the future any of tllem could be addressed by me justice system, FCC, Congress, or state legislatures. Therefore, the following 'analysis addresses each of me issues independently, rather than as a complete package.
Telephone and Cable TV Cross-Entry
This legislative proposal would amend the Communications Act to do away Witll tlle regulatory dichotomy between telephone and cable TV companies. Telephone and cable TV operators currently are regulated by separate and distinct schemes, where each is confirted to its segment of tlle market. This option would allow companies to build Bell Atlantic-TCI style information highways without having to skirt geographic borders or avoid regulatory restrictions. 26 Since telephone companies have powerful electronic switches and cable companies have high-capacity one-way transmission capabilities, both would benefit from uniting their respective technologies.
On tlle surface, this policy seems to benefit telephone and cable companies equally. Clearly, it would remove significant technological and economic barriers to convergence technology. However, this policy allows for competition in the local exchange. Therefore, in many markets tile RBOCs and cable TV companies most likely would choose to compete against each other by upgrading meir networks, rather than electing to cooperate in mergers and joint ventures. Phone companies would serve their cusJQmers on a video dial tone platform, while cable companies would install switching equipment and carry service on their installed base of coaxial television cable.
The competitive situation would be especially dramatic in major urban areas, where high-density customers cause substantial economies of scale. TIle result of this scenario is the potential for markets with either one dominant carrier and one or more weak carriers, or markets with no competition at all. The carrier able to achieve the highest scale economy would likely drive other carriers out or force them into weak competitive positions. In the worst case, the dominant carrier would "cherty-pick" the most profitable segments of the market, leaving high-cost service areas to non-dominant firms.
Competition for Local Exchange Telephone Service
In addition to the potential entry of cable TV companies into the market, a burgeoning industty of "alternate access vendors" (AAVs) already connect phone lines from customers' premises directly to long distance network access points, bypassing the regular local exchange carrier (LEe). AAVs typically cater to large long distance lIsers in metropolitan areas. Because AAVs only operate in LEes' most profitable markets, they undercut LEC ptices. Although this policy would create considerable competition for local exchange service, in some markets it has the potential for a signif1cant win-lose situation. The above example of AAV cream-skimming could be repeated several times over in every metropolitan area, potentially leaving the RBOCs only with high-cost territories and no way to generate subsidies with profits from lower-cost service. For this policy to be feasible, the RBOCs would need an offsetting benefit. The most apparent offset would be to repeal the MFJ restriction on long distance service, allowing the RBOCs to sell packaged local exchange and long distance service, thereby cushioning the impact of lost long distance network access revenue.
Telecommunication reform did not pass

RBoe Entry Into Long Distance
Another part of the l03rd Congress legislation would have allowed for both competition in local exchange service and RBOC entIy into the market for long distance. Under today's regime, for example, a call between Baltimore and Philadelphia must be carried by a long distance company such as AT&T, MCr, or Sprint, even though both cities are in Bell Atlantic's service territory. Under this proposal, however, Bell Atlantic would be free to compete against long distance companies for the service.
S.1822 would have allowed an RBOC to enter the market for long distance service, provided the RBOe passed four tests administered by the Department of Justice and FCC. Congress intended the tests to ensure that a proper level of local exchange competition existed before an RBOC entered the market for long distance. 2H However, the preconditions specified in the bill were too ambiguous to define clearly when a local exchange would be considered fully competitive. While S.1822 contained a date-certain for AAV, cable, and long distance company emry into local exchange service, the regulatory tests left the RBOCs uncertain about when they could go into long distance.
As with proposals for local exchange competition, allowing RBOCs to enter the market for long distance would create a powerful win-lose situation; however, unlike local service, the situation could cut two ways. In one scenario, the RBOCs could win while long distance companies lose. Since the bulk of long distance calling is within a few hundred miles of the customer's location, RBOCs could carry those calls on their networks with almost no modification of existing facilities. RBOC long distance service would begin soon after authorization, in an extremely efficient and competitive manner. Long distance companies quickly would lose considerable market share before they became significant players in the local exchange.
In the other scenario, the RBOCs could find themselves facing local exchange competition before having passed regulatOlY tests allowing them to enter long distance. This possibility caused RBOC lobbyists to oppose the final version of S.1822 in the 103rd Congress. During the 104th Congress, discussion arose over the possibility of a dateceltain approach to simultaneous opening of both markets to competition. The date-celtain approach does not alleviate concerns about the definition of ['ull local exchange competition, nor does it address contingencies when local competition fails to appear. With this policy alternative, there is not a clear winner or loser, nor is there any effective way to ensure that losers are compensated with a comparable benefit. The complexity of this dilemma illus-. trates the difficulty in finding adequate telecommunication reform alternatives.
Entry Into Telecommunications by Electric and Other Utility Companies
S.1822 also contained an amendment to the Public Utility Holding Companies Act of 1935 (PUHCA), which prohibits a registered public utility company from engaging in businesses not directly related to the company's core provision of utility service.
29 Enactment of this provision would be one of the most sweeping changes in the history of both telephone and non-telephone public utility service.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992, which separated the transmission of electricity from its bulk generation, prompted heavy power consumers to begin using electronic Demand-Side Management (DSM) systems to cUltail electric consumption during hours of peak demand. DSM sys-
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tems are geographically-dispersed digital data communication networks that monitor consumption of electricity on a power grid. A factory, for example, can use a DSM system to boost assembly line production during off-peak hours.3o DSM systems can be easily modified to carry telecommunication tratfic. In the above example, the factory could connect its internal telecommunications system to the DSM network, and use it to cany digital voice, data, and video. Witll interconnection, DSM network providers could compete for service against local and long distance telecommunication companies.
Manufacturing Authority-for RBOCs
Another section of the legislation proposed during the 103rd Congress would have overturned the MF] RBOC manufacturing restriction. 31 Many observers view the rnanufacturing prohibition as the most restrictive part of tlle MFj, and would like to see it removed. Other analysts see the restriction as a fundamental measure protecting monopoly local exchange service from cross-subsidy. Still another viewpoint favors the manufacturing restriction not to protect against cross-subsidies, but as a method to ensure that manufacturers bring the latest technology to market independently.
The emergence of competition on the fringes of local exchange telephone service has begun a spiral of events that will lead to construction of the yet undefined Information Superhighway.
The Consent Decree prohibited the RBOCs from all types of manufacturing activity, including not only the fabrication of equipment but all research and development. Ten years later, with technological convergence, tlle RBOCs protest the manufacturing restriction because they want to participate in the design and development of devices used to build tl1eir networks. As US West Chairman Richard McCormick explained in Senate testimony, selvice companies must collaborate closely Witll equipment makers to develop advanced technology:
The set-top box and video servers it will take to make multi-media [hybrid telephone-television] a reality aren't available from "off tlle shelf." They're still in the laboratory where engineers are trying to get the bugs out of tl1em. The restrictions severely compromise our ability to engage in design discllssions with manufacturers ...
Whenever one of our people has a good idea, that individual must share [itl with a battery of attomeys who make their best judgment as to whether carrying [itl forward would violate the MFJ. .. They don't let their imaginations run as freely. They're not as creative. They're more disappointed than entrepreneurialY
The MFJ restricts the RBOCs in everything from low-level technical discussions with manufacturers to participation in joint business ventures. While the MFJ succeeded in divesting the Bell System of Western Electric, it'> manufacturing subsidiary, today the manufacturing prohibition is not serving such a clear purpose. Proponents of the restriction feel that it prevents RBOCs from holding the latest technology "on the shelf" until they can fully depreciate existing network assets and facilities. Another school of thought, however, feels that with adequate competition the market will give companies sufficient incentive to deploy the latest equipment.
Analysis & Conclusions
The emergence of competition on the fringes of local exchange telephone service has begun a spiral of events that will lead to constmction of the yet undefined Information Superhighway. Although there has been much talk of telecommunication reform and a tremendous amount of attention paid to convergence technology, the Information Superhighway has yet to emerge in a congruent form. While we see many individual information highways in wide area computer systems, long distance telephone networks, cable 1V systems, and the Internet, market dynamics have not evolved to the point where multiple competitors provide all these services on a Single conduit.
But the beginning of competition on the fringes of the most profitable local exchange services will change this. Today the AAVs are cream-skimming RBOC profit'> the same way MCI and early long distance competitors creamskimmed AT&T's long distance routes. Cable operators and long distance companies are poised to enter the local exchange when policy permit'>.
All of this competition promises to drive local exchange pricing structures to levels that accurately reflect the true cost of service. Today, discerning the relationship between local exchange costs and prices is difficult, because rate-ofreturn regulation encourages telephone companies to charge flat rates with implicit subsidies. In the future, local 60 exchange carriers will be competing in a high-tech multiservice envirorunent, providing various combinations of individual service elements. In this environment, competition-not rate-of-return regulation-will determine specific service prices. To achieve economies of scale, telecommunication companies will be forced to provide economically attractive "packages" of service.
All of this competition promises to drive local exchange pricing structures to levels that accurately reflect the true cost of service.
Packages will consist of combinations of local and long distance telephone, interactive video, and data communications service. They will be available in a variety of "tiers," catering to a range of customers from large organizations to residential consumers. As these multi-service packages emerge, they will change telephone, television, and computer service into a technologically-converged digital Information Superhighway. Competitive packages of broadband interactive multimedia services will be available on a single conduit, from several proViders. As this occurs, the National Information Infrastructure will come into existence.
The growing amount of local exchange competition makes telecommunication reform as inevitable today as it was in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Events in that era showed that telecommunication reform was too complex to be solved with incremental policy change, hence the failure of legislation in the 96th Congress and, ultimately, divestiture. 
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Information Highway is by its nature interstate, the government must present federal policy guidance in order for this complex system to fully develop (federal meaning unified policy for all levels of government, instead of rudimentary jurisdictional preemption).
In order for telecommunication reform to be successfi.tl, Congress must take a non-incremental approach to change. Regarding potential winners and losers, Gore said:
Each industry is trying to enter new markets while keeping competitors out of its own old market. Although each increment appears to create too many winners and losers, a fully reformed market will have nothing but winners. The telecommunications industry will grow like the major conglomerates of the industrial era in the early 20th century. Full competition will bring convergence technology into our homes, offices, schools, libraries, and hospitals. We will find new applications for information technology that we cannot imagine today. A high-tech revolution will create the America of the 21st century, an 
